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Abstract Many who take a dismissive attitude towards metaphysics trace their view
back to Carnap’s ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ (1950a). But the reason
Carnap takes a dismissive attitude to metaphysics is a matter of controversy. I will
argue that no reason is given in ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’, and this is
because his reason for rejecting metaphysical debates was given in ‘Pseudo-Problems
in Philosophy’ (1928). The argument there assumes verificationism, but I will argue
that his argument survives the rejection of verificationism. The root of his argument is
the claim that metaphysical statements cannot be justified; the point is epistemic, not
semantic. I will argue that this remains a powerful challenge to metaphysics that has
yet to be adequately answered.
Keywords Carnap · Confirmation · Prior probability
1 Introduction
Metaphysics can induce frustration. Many philosophers would have had the expe-
rience, perhaps early in graduate school, of listening to a metaphysics debate and
wondering whether anything was really at issue. The feeling of frustration has an
esteemed history. One of the central ideas of logical positivism was that there is some-
thing wrong with metaphysical debates. Despite the rehabilitation of metaphysics in
recent years, the worry that there is still something wrong with metaphysical debates
has not gone away. Following Bennett (2009), we’ll call this deliberately loose idea
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dismissivism.1 Many dismissivists trace their view back to Carnap’s ‘Empiricism,
Semantics and Ontology’ (1950a). But the reason Carnap takes a dismissive attitude
to metaphysics is a matter of controversy. I will suggest that no reason is given in
‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’, and this is because his reason for rejecting
metaphysical debateswas given in ‘Pseudo-Problems in Philosophy’ (1928). The argu-
ment there assumes verificationism, which is why Carnap claims that there is no fact of
the matter about the answer to metaphysical questions—any candidate answer would
be meaningless. But I will argue that his argument survives the rejection of verifica-
tionism. The root of his argument is the claim that metaphysical statements cannot be
justified; the point is epistemic, not semantic, and remains a challenge to metaphysics.
To be clear, I am not a historian and my interests are not primarily historical. I
extensively discuss Carnap because I think the best argument against metaphysics can
be found in his writings. Think of me as asking, on behalf of those who are suspicious
of metaphysics: can an argument against metaphysics be salvaged from the wreckage
of verificationism? The thrust of this paper is that it can be; the metaphysics-induced
feeling of frustration is appropriate. Furthermore, the Carnapian argument applies to
much of philosophy, not just metaphysics.
I’m also coming at the question from this direction because ‘Empiricism, Semantics
and Ontology’ plays a large role in the background of many contemporary criticisms
of metaphysics, for example Chalmers (2009), Hirsch (2002, 2005), Price (1997,
2009), Putnam (1987), Sidelle (2002), Thomasson (2007, 2009) and Yablo (2000). If
‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ doesn’t contain the core of Carnap’s argument
however, those criticisms are based on shaky foundations. Instead, I think the epistemic
arguments of Bennett (2009), Kreigel (2013) and others, rather than expressing a new
worry for metaphysics, are returning the debate to the issues that motivated Carnap.
Part 2 argues that ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ is enthymematic. In part
3, I reconstruct Carnap’s (1928) epistemological argument and in part 4 I formulate
an improved version. I consider interpretational objections in part 5 and philosophical
objections in part 6. In part 7 I apply the argument to some metaphysical debates. Part
8 concludes.
2 Linguistic frameworks
Why did Carnap dismiss metaphysics? Here is what he says in a well-known passage:
If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he
has to introduce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we
shall call this procedure the construction of a linguistic framework for the new
entities in question. And now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of
existence: first, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind
within the framework; we call them internal questions; and second, questions
concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, called
external questions. (1950a/1991, p. 86, italics original)
1 It is important to keep this as a loose idea for now because the best formulation of dismissivism is one of
the things at stake in this paper.
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Carnap then claims that there is something wrong with external questions:
From these [internal] questions we must distinguish the external question of
the reality of the thing world itself. In contrast to the former questions, this
question is raised neither by the man in the street nor by scientists, but only by
philosophers. Realists give an affirmative answer, subjective idealists a negative
one, and the controversy goes on for centuries without ever being solved. And
it cannot be solved because it is framed in a wrong way. (1950a/1991, p. 86)
So the debate between idealists and realists should be dismissed because they are
framed in the wrong way. But why are they framed in a wrong way? Carnap continues
the passage:
To be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the system; hence
this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself. (1950a/1991,
p. 86)
But this raises many questions. First, why should we distinguish scientific from non-
scientific senses of real? Second, even if we do, why think that to be real in a scientific
sense is to be an element of the system? Third, even if it is, why can’t the concept be
meaningfully applied to the whole system? Fourth, even if it can’t, why not invent a
new, philosophical, concept that can be meaningfully applied to the whole system? A
little later Carnap says:
…[T]he thesis of the reality of the thing world…cannot be formulated in the
thing language or, it seems, in any other theoretical language. (1950a/1991, p.
87, Italics added)
And this gets to the heart of the matter. Carnap’s dismissivism seems to rest on the
semantic claim that the thesis of the reality of the world cannot be formulated. But
why can’t the thesis of the reality of the thing world be formulated?
Dismissivists have tended to assume that ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’
provides an argument, but when we look there is little to be found. Hirsch (2009) is
commendably blunt: ‘I do not understand Carnap’s explanation of why ontological
issues reduce to linguistic choices.’ (2009, p. 231).2 I think the reason is that no expla-
nation is given in ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’. In fact Carnap is explicit
that his only aim in that paper is to explain how one can quantify over abstract objects
without giving up one’s empiricist scruples.3 Yet Carnap seems to have an argument
in mind.
2 Sidelle agrees: ‘I have not really found—verificationism aside—a real argument in Carnap.’ (2016, p.
79)
3 He is explicit about this from the first sentence, and especially at the end of his introductory section:
‘The nature and implications of the acceptance of a language referring to abstract entities will first be
discussed in general; it will be shown that using such a language does not imply embracing a Platonic
ontology but is perfectly compatible with empiricism and strictly scientific thinking…It is hoped that the
clarification of the issue will be useful to those who would like to accept abstract entities in their work in
mathematics, physics, semantics, or any other field; it may help them to overcome nominalistic scruples.’
This also answers Eklund’s (2013, p. 237) question of why Carnap (1950a) doesn’t discuss nominalistic
languages—nominalistic languages do not conflict with nominalistic scruples.
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I think Carnap has in mind the argument given in his (1928). In fact the relevant
argument is given in the final 5 pages of his 1928 monograph, an argument which, I
think, remains a powerful challenge to metaphysics.
3 Pseudo-problems in philosophy
In this section I will reconstruct and update Carnap’s argument for dismissivism.
Carnap (1928) first defends the following principle:
A statement p is said to have “factual content”, if experiences which would
support p or the contradictory of p are at least conceivable. (p. 327)
We can simplify this principle as follows,4 and, for obvious reasons, call it Verifica-
tionism:
Verificationism If sentence S has factual content then evidence which would
support S or −S is conceivable
Carnap then applies Verificationism to the realism controversy using the following
story:
Two geographers, a realist and an idealist, who are sent out in order to find out
if a mountain that is supposed to be somewhere in Africa is only legendary or if
it really exists, will come to the same (positive or negative) result.
…
There is disagreement between the two scientists onlywhen they no longer speak
as geographers but as philosophers, when they give a philosophical interpretation
of the empirical results aboutwhich they agree. Then the realist says: “thismoun-
tain, which the two of us have found, not only has the ascertained geographical
properties, but is, in addition, also real”… The idealist on the other hand says:
“on the contrary, the mountain itself is not real, only our (or in the case of the
“solipsist” variety of idealism: “only my”) perceptions and conscious processes
are real”… These two theses which are here in opposition to one another go
beyond experience [i.e. evidence] and have no factual content. Neither of the
disputants suggests that his thesis should be tested through some joint decisive
experiment, nor does any one of them give an indication of the design of an
experiment through which his thesis could be supported.
Our example can easily be generalized. What is true for the mountain is true
for the external world in general. Since we consider only factual content as the
criterion for the meaningfulness of statements, neither the thesis of realism that
4 Fourminor changes have beenmade. First, the direction of the conditional has been reversed. The direction
from factual content to conceivable experiences is the one supported by the argument Carnap gives which
we’ll come to below. (Carnap almost certainly endorsed the bi-conditional.) Second, ‘statement’ has been
changed to the less ambiguous ‘sentence’. Third, ‘factual content’ no longer appears in quotes. Fourth,
‘experiences’ has been replaced with ‘evidence’. This is to fit better with modern terminology, and to avoid
any connotations of certainty, or immunity to doubt—Carnap seems to use ‘experience’ and ‘evidence’
interchangeably. The key point is that evidence is a posteriori. As long as this is kept in mind, feel free to
replace ‘evidence’ with ‘experience’ or ‘observation’.
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the external world is real, nor that of idealism that the external world is not real
can be considered scientifically meaningful, pp. 333–334. [Italics original]
The two key claims are, first, that for any sentence S that expresses a metaphysical
hypothesis (realism, idealism, etc…), S (and −S) go beyond evidence and, second,
it follows that there is no conceivable evidence that would support S or −S. Letting
S express a metaphysical hypothesis, we can put these two claims into the following
principle:
2. It is not the case that evidence which would support S or −S is conceivable.
Combining this with Verificationism produces the following argument.
Carnapian Argument
1. If sentence S has factual content then evidence which would support S or
−S is conceivable (Verificationism).
2. It is not the case that evidence which would support S or −S is conceivable.
3. Therefore, S does not have factual content.
This is my reconstruction of Carnap’s argument for dismissivism. We can finally state
Carnap’s version of dismissivism: metaphysical sentences have no factual content.
Is this interpretation of Carnap controversial? Somewill say no—it is widely agreed
that Carnap’s verificationism played a role in his critique of metaphysics. Even if this
reconstruction is uncontroversial, I will use it to argue that the appeal to verificationism
is not essential.
But some will think this is a controversial reconstruction of Carnap, as it is incom-
patible with two widely held theses about Carnap’s critique of metaphysics. First,
some hold that there is a close connection between Carnap’s critique of metaphysics
and either the internal/external distinction or the analytic/synthetic distinction (or
both).5 But the Carnapian Argument doesn’t rely on the analytic/synthetic or the
internal/external distinction.6
Second, the quote above shows that Carnap allows that external questions could
be acceptable if there is possible evidence that might settle them; this suggests that
5 E.g. Quine (1951a, b).
6 The terminology of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ can be used to mark many different distinctions e.g. (i) use
versus mention (ii) metaphysical versus non-metaphysical (iii) subset of entities versus whole system of
entities (iv) within a language versus not within a language (v) grammatical versus ungrammatical (vi)
cognitive versus pragmatic. Thus I think the internal/external terminology is best avoided. Reasons for the
confusion can be traced to Carnap (1950a), in ways that do not seem to have been noticed. He says in the
first quote above: ‘first, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework;
we call them internal questions; and second, questions concerning the existence or reality of the system
of entities as a whole, called external questions.’ In the first clause, it is unclear whether it is the entities
that are within the framework or the questions. That is, we could parse the sentence as ‘questions of the
[existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework]’ or as ‘[questions of the existence of
certain entities of the new kind] within the framework. Also, internal and external questions are defined in
such a way that they are compatible—a question could be within the framework and about the reality of
the system of entities as a whole. There are two distinctions to keep track of: (a) between questions that
are within the framework and questions that are not within the framework (b) between questions about the
reality of the system of entities as a whole and questions not about the reality of the system of entities as a
whole.
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interpretations of Carnap on which external questions are ungrammatical are mis-
taken.7
4 Updating Carnap’s argument
Is the argument convincing? Not as stated, but I will argue that both premises can be
improved.
Premise 1 would certainly be rejected by contemporary philosophers, as verifica-
tionism has long been rejected,8 and such Carnapian arguments are usually dismissed
on the grounds that they presuppose verificationism.
But we can now see the key point: verificationism is a dispensable part of the
argument. At the heart of Carnap’s argument is a claim about justification. I think this
is what Carnap was really getting at, but, more importantly, it improves the argument.
If we go back to Carnap’s example of the two geographers, the root of the unease
about the dispute between realism and idealism is that ‘these two theses…go beyond
experience [evidence]’, and disputes that go beyond evidence are problematic because
it is unclear howwe can have justification to believe one side over the other. So I suggest
we replace:
1. If sentence S has factual content then evidence which would support S or −S
is conceivable (Verificationism)
with:
1’. If we can have justification for S then evidence which would support S over
−S is conceivable.9
Let’s move on to premise 2:
2. It is not the case that evidence which would support S or −S is conceivable.
At this point we need to say something about the concept of support. Fortunately, there
is wide agreement that the best analysis of the concept of support (confirmation) is
the Bayesian probability raising account that, where P expresses an agent’s degree of
belief,
E supports S iff P(E|S) > P(E| − S)10,11
7 E.g. Price (2009).
8 Russell (1947) and Magidor (2009).
9 S and T are restricted to non-tautologies. Carnap thought that tautologies had no factual content, and
so had no need to restrict his argument in this way. But I will remain neutral on whether tautologies have
factual content, and whether we can have justification to believe them. Thanks to Daniel Nolan for raising
this issue.
10 The agent’s background beliefs are contained in the credence function P and will be left implicit. These
will be relevant to the inequality and account for confirmation holism (see below).
11 Salmon (1975). Salmon actually discusses P(S|E) > P(S), but this is equivalent to the inequality in the
text assuming that 0 < P(S) < 1. The only Bayesian tenets we need are that beliefs should not violate the
axioms of probability.
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(Whether P can stand for rational belief will be a key issue later.) So premise 2 says
that for any conceivable evidence E,P(E|S) = P(E| − S). We can think of premise 2
as saying that S is immune to evidence. But now we face a problem.
Which sentences are immune to evidence? Plausibly, none, due to confirmation
holism. That is, given the right background information, any sentence can confirm any
other sentence. For example, take a paradigm sentence that looks immune to evidence:
‘19 angels can dance on the head of a pin’. And suppose our background information
includes ‘if I see a red flash then 19 angels can dance on the head of a pin’. Now
‘19 angels can dance on the head of a pin’ is not immune to evidence. This is a toy
example, but the point should be clear—given the right background information, for
any sentence, there is some evidence that would confirm it12,13. Thus, few, if any,
candidates for S satisfy premise 2.
I think this objection can be answered. The key is to notice, first, that in many
metaphysical debates a sentence is contrasted, not with its negation, but with an alter-
native.14 And second, the alternatives are usually intended to predict all the same
evidence. For example, consider the debate between the realist and the idealist above:
H1 = The mountain is real (and goes beyond our perceptions)
H2 = Only our perceptions are real.
The realist and the idealist will both set up their hypotheses so that they predict the
same evidence.15 H1 and H2 are empirically equivalent i.e. they predict exactly the
same evidence, so for any E,P(E|H1) = P(E|H2). If follows that no conceivable evi-
dence supports H1 over H2. Given a debate that has been carefully circumscribed in
this way, the point about confirmation holism will have no force. We can grant that
any sentence can be confirmed by any other (given particular background beliefs), but
no evidence will support realism over idealism or vice versa (given that they predict
exactly the same evidence). To put it another way, for any two theories, if conceiv-
able evidence E confirms one over the other, the two theories cannot be realism and
idealism.
12 This is famously part of Quine’s (1951a) attack on logical positivism.
13 Van Fraassen faces complications here. He claims (1980, p. 12) that science does not aim to show that
theories are true, but he does seem to allow that science can show that they are false (1998, p. 215). It’s not
obvious how this asymmetry is to be explained; see alsoHájek (1998),Monton (1998).My suggestion is that
when the issue is S versus −S, science can confirm or refute S. When the issue is S versus (a well-chosen)
T, science can neither confirm nor refute S.
14 Sober (1990) calls a similar position ‘contrastive empiricism’. My position differs from Sober’s in
two main respects. First, he thinks that hypotheses cannot be compared with their negation; they must be
contrastedwith an alternative. I don’t endorse this claim. I use S and T (rather than−S), only because S and
T are more often empirically equivalent. Second, the reason Sober thinks that claims cannot be compared
with their negation is his denial of rationality constraints on priors. I don’t rule out rationality constraints
on priors.
15 For a more scientific example, compare Putnam’s (1983, pp. 42–43):
H1 = Space–time consists of points
H2 = Space–time consists of extended space–time neighbourhoods.
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Applying this to premise 2, the improved version says that the target sentences are
empirically equivalent. So we replace:
2. It is not the case that evidence which would support S or −S is conceivable
with:
2C. It is not the case that evidence which would support S over T is conceivable.
In many cases, metaphysicians engaged in a debate intend that their competing
hypotheses should be empirically equivalent. However, if hypotheses are not empiri-
cally equivalent then 2C will not apply, and the range of debates for which evidence is
relevant is highly contentious. For example, consider the debate about whether num-
bers exist. If there could be evidence confirming that there is a prime number between 4
and 6 (e.g. a proof that 5 is not divisible by 2, 3 or 4), then 2C will not apply. Similarly,
if finding a best theory of the world that quantifies over numbers would be evidence
for the existence of numbers, then 2C will not apply.16,17 So the epistemological
argument we are developing deflates debates that can not be resolved by evidence and
vindicates debates that can be resolved by evidence; whether a debate is scientific,
philosophical or metaphysical does not come into it.We’ll come back to this in Sect. 6,
where the upshot will be that whether our argument applies will have to be assessed
on a case-by-case basis, varying with the topic, and even with the philosopher.
One final modification. In order for 2C to fit the first premise, we have to compare
S with T in the first premise too. So we replace
1′. If we can have justification for S then evidence which would support S over
−S is conceivable.
with
1C. If we can have justification for S over T then evidence which would support
S over T is conceivable.18
Putting these together, we arrive at the challenge to contemporary metaphysics.
Epistemological Argument
1C. If we can have justification for S over T then evidence which would support
S over T is conceivable.
2C. It is not the case that evidence which would justify S over T is conceivable.
3C. Therefore we cannot have justification for S over T.
This argument is not semantic, but epistemic. Insteadof saying thatmetaphysical theses
can’t be stated, it says that we can have no justification to believe them. The result
16 Quine (1948), Field (1980).
17 Alternatively, if we grant that there are analytic sentences, we could hold that it is analytic that numbers
exist. But I want to remain neutral on the analytic/synthetic distinction.
18 The phrase ‘justification for S over T’ is a bit awkward but just means that in a rational credence function,
PE(S) > PE(T), where E is (possibly empty) background evidence. We might more naturally talk about
justification to believe S over T, but this might be misinterpreted as referring to traditional all-or-nothing
belief, or as requiring a high posterior.
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is almost as devastating for metaphysics. If we can have no justification to believe
a metaphysical hypothesis, there is no point trying to have a rational metaphysical
debate—so there is no point doing metaphysics.19
To recap, Carnap’s argument ran:
Verificationism + Metaphysics can’t be justified = Metaphysics has no content
Oncewe reject verificationism, the conclusion thatmetaphysics has no content can’t be
defended. But the heart of the argument, that metaphysics can’t be justified, remains.
To reject the Epistemological Argument we’d have to argue either that some meta-
physical theses can be justified by the evidence (thus rejecting 2C) or that we can have
non-evidential justification for some metaphysical hypothesis (thus rejecting 1C). I’ll
come back to this in part 6.
Before moving on I’ll briefly compare three recent works by Karen Bennett, Ted
Sider and Uriah Kriegel that make related points.20 Bennett (2009) suggests a similar
epistemic conclusion, but for different reasons. She suggests that often ‘there is little
justification’ (p. 42) for opposing metaphysical hypotheses. Her reasoning is that as
most metaphysicians want to minimize the difference between their own view and
their opponent’s, the resulting views end up so similar that arguments against one
view rebound against the other view.21 She seems to grant that we do have non-
evidential justification, but thinks this justification often ends up being weak. In my
terms, Bennett denies 1C, but offers a different path to 3C (or perhaps a weaker version
of 3C).
Sider (2011) notes a similar challenge in passing:
One complaint [about metaphysical disputes, and in Sider’s example about
extended simples] is purely epistemic. It admits that the dispute is substantive,
but claims that the considerations offered by the enthusiasts [metaphysicians] are
inadequate to resolve it. We do not knowwhether there exist extended simples, it
is alleged, and the enthusiasts [metaphysicians] arguments aren’t helping. (p. 80)
Although Sider quickly dismisses three other complaints (p. 82) there is no quick
dismissal of this one.22
19 Wilson (2011) is the closest forerunner I have found as an interpretation of Carnap. See also Biggs and
Wilson (2016).
20 See also Merricks (2001), p. 9, Ladyman and Ross (2007), Maclaurin and Dyke (2012), Donaldson,
(2015). Van Fraassen’s (1980) influential defence of empiricism also coheres with this approach; he claims
we should be agnostic about unobservable entities, which is an epistemological claim.
21 Here’s one of Bennett’s examples: ‘One of van Inwagen’s main arguments for nihilism is the conjunction
of the claim that (a) all of the nonextreme answers to the Special Composition Question are unacceptably
arbitrary, with the claim that (b) the extreme answer ‘always’ is not acceptable for other reasons (1990, pp.
74–80). Nihilism is the only remaining option. However, the nihilist is actually threatened with arbitrariness
just as much as the believer is. The nihilist does indeed have a straightforward answer to the…question
‘when, if ever, do some things compose an F?’…[T]he nihilist will say ‘never’. But there is a question closely
analogous to the second of those two, to which the nihilist does not have a straightforward answer—namely,
‘when, if ever, are some things arranged Fwise?’, p. 66
22 This is not to say that Sider has no answer. He answers it using the samemethodological principles about
theory choice as science, a Quinean strategy he endorses in ch. 2. He is explicit in his (2013): ‘Nihilism
is an ideologically simpler theory, and so is more likely to be true’ p. 239. This is a specific version of the
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Kreigel (2013) provides the most detailed discussion of this epistemic challenge,
and his discussion is in the same spirit as my own. In my terms, he defends 1C and
2C, but ends up suggesting that there must be some way to avoid 3C. I will briefly
suggest a way in part 6, which discusses objections to the Epistemological Argument.
But in the intervening part I will discuss objections to this interpretation of Carnap.
5 Objections: interpretational issues
Consider two prongs of attack to my interpretation of Carnap. First, is there textual
evidence to support it? Second, is there textual evidence against it?
Is there textual evidence to support this interpretation that Carnap’s argument
against metaphysics was given in 1928? This reconstruction is supported by the brief
commentsCarnapmakes in ‘Empiricism, Semantics andOntology’.Whenmentioning
his rejection of ‘both the thesis of the reality of the external world and the thesis of its
irreality as pseudo-statements’(1950a/1991, p. 91) he cites his 1928 monograph. Fur-
thermore, towards the end of ‘Empiricism, Semantics andOntology’ he says, regarding
the ‘problematic’ external questions:
I cannot think of any possible evidence that would be regarded as relevant by
both philosophers, and therefore, if actually found, would decide the controversy
or at least make one of the opposite theses more probable than the other…There-
fore I feel compelled to regard the external question as a pseudo-question, until
both parties to the controversy offer a common interpretation of the question
as a cognitive question; this would involve an indication of possible evidence
regarded as relevant by both sides. Italics added. (1950a/1991, p. 96)
Notice that Carnap does not say that these external questions are meaningless, or
ungrammatical. All he says is that both parties need to agree about what evidence
would be relevant to the question. This epistemic point is in perfect agreement with
his earlier 1928 monograph.
And in his intellectual autobiography Carnap explicitly refers back to his 1928
monograph:
Grünbaum regards phenomenalism as a “profound error”; we are entirely in
agreement with him in this rejection, but we should prefer to say “pseudo-
statement” instead of “error”. Furthermore, Grünbaum says that he does not
know of any refutation or even an adequate treatment of the arguments for
realism. If “realism” is understood as preference for the reistic language over
the phenomenal language, then I am also a realist.
However, if “realism” is understood, in the customary sense, as an ontological
thesis, then the arguments against it were given inmymonograph [1928]; I do not
know of any refutation or even a thorough critical discussion of my arguments.
(1963, p. 870) Italics added
Footnote 22 continued
strategy I defend. I claim only that there is non-evidential justification for metaphysical sentences; I don’t
claim that the same principles operate as in science, nor that different ones do.
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This is a remarkable passage.Writing in his old age, Carnap refers back to an argument
he gave some 45 years earlier in order to defend one of the most important theses in
his philosophy.
And in a detailed discussion of the development of Carnap’s thought, Lutz (2017)
notes the similarity of the criteria of empirical significance defended in 1928 and
1963 and concludes: ‘It seems, then, that Carnap’s philosophical position has changed
very little, although decades of technical work lie between these two statements of
empiricism.’
Onto the second prong—is this interpretation compatible with Carnap’s other writ-
ings? A worry is that the received wisdom is that Carnap underwent a radical shift in
his views in 1935, marking the transition from the syntactic period to the semantic
period. However, there is little agreement on exactly what this shift amounted to. Car-
nap’s own understanding (1963) is that he adopted Tarski’s theory of truth, allowing
him to talk about semantic notions such as truth and reference. If so, this won’t be
in conflict with his 1928 argument, which is epistemological. Recent discussions of
Carnap’s shift have downplayed its significance (Creath 1999; Tuboly ms). I can’t see
any reason to think that this shift would stop him from relying on his 1928 argument
in later work.
Are other works of Carnap problematic for my interpretation? A referee suggests
that Carnap offers numerous arguments against metaphysics between 1928 and 1950.
But somewhat surprisingly this is not the case. The most relevant discussions are
(1934a) “TheRejection ofMetaphysics” and (1934b) “On theCharacter of Philosophic
Problems”. His 1934a is in the same spirit as his 1928, but goes into considerably less
detail. His 1934b is more significant. In a key passage, he claims that content can be
reduced to syntax:
For what…do we want to know when we ask concerning the content…of a
proposition S? We wish to know what S conveys to us; what we experience
through S. p. 12
This passage clearly presupposes verificationism (non-verificationists can hold that
the content of a proposition goes beyond our experiences). But notice that Carnap is
explicit once again that at root he is interested in the relation between the sentence
and the experiences that would confirm it. So we can still get off the boat before the
verificationism and make an epistemological point: ‘what do we want to know when
we ask concerning whether we have justification for a proposition S? We wish to
know…what we experience through S’. More naturally put, we wish to know what
experiences are predicted by S. Thus, all justification is through experience.23
23 Some philosophers (most explicitly Hylton 1982, but compare Ricketts 1982) have taken the dispute
between Quine and Carnap to involve a methodological dispute about how we should decide between
incompatible theories that agree with our evidence. If a methodological dispute is understood as a dispute
about whether we can have justification that goes beyond evidence, then my interpretation coheres with
theirs. Thanks to Vera Flocke for emphasizing this.
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6 Objections: philosophical issues
Let’s move on to the philosophical objections. Howmight metaphysical debates avoid
the argument? We would have to deny either 1C or 2C.
Start with 2C, which says that no conceivable evidence would justify S over
T. It might be argued that there is conceivable evidence that would favour some
metaphysical hypotheses over others. There are two moving parts here—the specific
metaphysical debate at issue, and our conception of evidence.
Regarding the first moving part, many philosophical debates are not intended to
disagree about the evidence; think of Carnap’s example of realism versus idealism,
the Special Composition Question,24 the debate between endurantists and perduran-
tists,25 or whether the whole universe is prior to its parts.26 Suppose a confirmation
holist points out that there are possible background beliefs that would allow evi-
dence to favour realism over idealism, such as ‘if you see a red flash then realism is
true’. How should the realist and idealist respond? Presumably they should respond
that such a background belief could not be justified by any conceivable evidence.
And this would follow from realism and idealism being empirically equivalent i.e.
P(red flash|realism) = P(red flash|idealism).
But in some debates it is more plausible that one side can cite some evidence in
support—for example, some think that our experience of the passage of time supports
a ‘moving now’ theory of time.27 Or perhaps common sense gives us evidence.28 I’m
inclined to think that evidence is rarely relevant to metaphysics. And in fact I think that
evidence is rarely relevant to any area of philosophy (thus I am on Bennett’s (2016)
side in her debate with Hofweber (2016)). This would make 2C widely applicable
in philosophy, but others will disagree. (I’ll continue to talk only about metaphysical
hypotheses.)
The extent to which evidence could favour competing metaphysical hypotheses
depends on the other moving part—our conception of evidence. For example, if the
evidence of agents in a physical world is different from the evidence of agents in a
mental world, then our evidence might favour physicalism over Berkeleyean ideal-
ism.29 Relatedly, some hold that we have intuitions that count as evidence and favour
some metaphysical hypotheses over others.30 More generally, the more expansive our
concept of evidence, the easier it is for evidence to justify metaphysical hypothe-
ses. Indeed, part of the motivation for developing an expansive concept of evidence
is to make metaphysical debates tractable. So whether the Epistemological Argu-
ment described above applies to a debate depends on contentious issues regarding
the nature of evidence and whether the competing theories are empirically equivalent.
24 van Inwagen (1990).
25 Hawley (2015).
26 Schaffer (2010). Koslicki (2016) makes a similar point in relation to Carnap. See Huemer (2009) and
Benovsky (2016) for a detailed discussion of various cases.
27 Thanks to Al Wilson for this example. See Prosser (2011), Benovsky (2013, 2016).
28 Korman (2015).
29 E.g. Williamson (2000), Campbell (2002) and other versions of disjunctivism.
30 E.g. Bealer (1998) and Chudnoff (2011).
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I am inclined to accept a narrow notion of evidence31 that would make 2C widely
applicable in philosophy; again, others will disagree.
Let’s move on to 1C, which says that if we can have justification for S over T then
evidence which would support S over T is conceivable. To reject this premise is to
hold that we can have justification for S over T even when there is no conceivable
evidence either way.
At this point we need to distinguish epistemic justification from pragmatic justifica-
tion. Epistemic justification is connected to evidence and truth; pragmatic justification
is based on usefulness, the type of justification you have for believing in God on the
grounds that God rewards believers. Carnap suggests in ‘Empiricism, Semantics and
Ontology’ that we can have pragmatic (but not epistemic) justification for S over T.32
But mere pragmatic justification is not very satisfying. Moreover, how could we know
which theory will be most useful if we have not established that there is an external
world, or that the future will resemble the past? The rest of the paper will be concerned
with only epistemic justification.
I want to sketch how we could have epistemic justification for S over T. As no
conceivable evidence canprovide epistemic justification,weneedpriori considerations
favouring S over T. I think this is the best place to block the argument and defend
metaphysics. Furthermore, this approach can be supported by Carnap’s later work.
So in the next section I will run through how some a priori justifications might be
applied to some well-known debates. The aim is to bring out the assumptions the
metaphysician needs, and explain why dismissivists may find the resulting debate
frustrating.
7 Applications
1C says that ifwe can have justification for S over T then evidencewhichwould support
S over T is conceivable.We deny 1C if we hold that we can have justification for S over
T independently of evidence. Such justification works on the prior. This concept of a
prior is familiar fromBayeisan epistemology, where the prior is often written as P(S)33
and the posterior as P(S|E). So, what determines which hypotheses have the highest
prior? A natural answer is to appeal to the theoretical virtues, for example, simplicity,
scope, unification and fruitfulness (Kuhn 1977). So the metaphysician has to tell a
story about what these virtues are exactly, and how they are balanced against each
other. Skipping part of this debate, let’s suppose that simplicity has been identified as
the sole basic theoretical virtue.
31 See Wedgwood (2002) and Hedden (2015).
32 ‘The acceptance or rejection of abstract linguistic forms, just as the acceptance or rejection of any other
linguistic forms in any branch of science, will finally be decided by their efficiency as instruments, the ratio
of the results achieved to the amount and complexity of the efforts required.’ (Carnap 1950a/1991, p. 95)
Quine, rejecting the analytic/synthetic distinction, extends this to all hypotheses: ‘Carnap maintains that
ontological questions…are questions not of fact but of choosing a convenient scheme or framework for
science; and with this I agree only if the same be conceded for every scientific hypothesis.’ (1951b, p. 72)
33 Somehold that theremust be a place for backgroundknowledge, inwhich case the backgroundknowledge
is empty here.
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I think metaphysical debates can often be understood as a search for the simplest
theory that explains the data. Consider two examples. First, the debate between Pla-
tonists (there are universals) and nominalists (there are no universals) often turns on
whether the nominalist can account for all the data e.g. the truth of the sentence ‘there
are undiscovered properties’.34 The shared implicit assumption is that if the nominalist
can account for the data, then the nominalist wins. Why? Because the nominalist’s
theory is simpler, positing one type of fundamental thing (objects) rather than two
(properties and objects/substrata).35
Second, consider the debate between physicalists and dualists in the philosophy of
mind. This debate often turns onwhether the physicalist can account for all the data e.g.
thatMary learns something when she sees colour for the first time (Jackson 1986). The
shared implicit assumption is that if the physicalist can account for the data, then the
physicalist wins. Why? Because the physicalist’s theory is simpler, positing one type
of fundamental thing (the physical) rather than two (the physical and the mental).36
Even granting that we should prefer simpler theories, the metaphysician still has
more to do. There is a distinction between ontological (things in the world) and ideo-
logical (concepts needed to describe the world) simplicity; and ontological simplicity
then divides into quantitative (number of things) and qualitative (number of types of
thing) simplicity.37
Consider the debate about the foundations of modality.
On what we’ll call the Lewisian hypothesis, facts about modality are based
on facts about concrete worlds, and are best stated by quantifying over these
worlds.38
On what we’ll call the Priorian hypothesis, facts about modality are primitive,
and are best stated using primitive operators such as possibly.39
The disagreement between Lewisian and Priorian views is plausibly rooted in dis-
agreement about how to weigh up these different types of simplicity.
The Lewisian hypothesis scores well on qualitative ontological simplicity and ideo-
logical simplicity. The qualitative ontological cost of the Lewisian hypothesis is zero,
as it posits only types of thing thatwe already take to exist, namely concreteworlds. The
Lewisian hypothesis is also ideologically simple, as we don’t need primitive modal
concepts. The cost comes in quantitative ontological complexity, as the hypothesis
posits a possibly infinite number of concrete worlds.
34 Armstrong (1980).
35 The bundle theory also posits only one type of thing—properties (see Paul 2017).
36 See Huemer (2009) for a detailed discussion, and opposition. Appeals to simplicity are increasingly
explicit,e.g. in arguments for mereological nihilism (Sider 2013; Brenner 2015), presentism (Tallant 2013),
external world realism (Vogel 1990; Huemer 2016) and necessitism (Williamson 2013). See also Biggs
(2011) and Biggs and Wilson (2016, 2017).
37 Perhaps ideological simplicity also divides into quantitative and qualitative (Cowling 2013), but I’ll set
this aside.
38 Lewis (1986).
39 Prior (1957). Thanks to John Divers for discussion.
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The Priorian hypothesis scores well on qualitative and quantitiative ontological
simplicity. The ontological cost of the Priorian hypothesis is zero, as it posits no new
entities, nor types of entity. The cost comes in ideological complexity, as the hypothesis
posits primitive modal concepts.
Granting that this is part of what goes on in metaphysical debates, we can now
account for the frustration of the dismissivist. In fact there are four different ways
someone might get frustrated with these debates.
The first comes merely from the fact that the disagreement in these metaphysical
debates is of an unusual kind—it is based on disagreement about the prior. Most dis-
agreements are based on disagreement about the evidence, with the prior tucked away
in the background. Arguments normally proceed by each side presenting evidence;
being faced with a disagreement that cannot be resolved by evidence is a disconcerting
experience that might induce the feeling that something has gone wrong.
This kind of frustration is not a challenge to metaphysics however. The mere fact
that the disagreement is unusual is no threat, in itself, to the standing of the debate.
But this could be developed into the next source of frustration.
A second source of frustration will come from those who think that there is no
fact of the matter about what our priors ought to be. For example, a central strain of
Bayesianism, subjective Bayesianiam, holds that there are no rationality constraints
on priors. As long as the agent’s credences obey the rules of probability (and update by
conditionalization), that agent is rational.40 Anyone who has subjectivist intuitions is
going to find metaphysical debates baffling, as they think there is no fact of the matter
about rational priors, so no rational debate to be had. Subjectivists ask: why should
we expect the world to be simple? Metaphysicians are making an implicit assumption
that the subjectivist rejects.41
A third source of frustration comes ifwegrant thatwe shouldprefer simpler theories,
but deny that there is any fact of thematter about how these different types of simplicity
should be traded off. That is, one can grant that we should prefer the simpler theory
when there is a clear verdict about which theory is simpler, but deny that we should
prefer, say, ontological over ideological simplicity.
A fourth source of frustration comes even if we grant that there are ratio-
nal constraints on priors of scientific hypotheses. It doesn’t follow that there are
rational constraints on priors for metaphysical hypotheses. The metaphysician has
to argue that there are constraints on priors for the whole range of debates she
engages in. So even objective Bayesians can get off the boat at this final step and
hold that metaphysical debates are pointless, because neither side can justify their
answer.42
The burden on the metaphysician can now be sharply put. Firstly, they have to argue
that it makes sense to argue about rational priors. Secondly, they have to defend the
40 I share Sider’s surprise: ‘Fascinatingly, this descendent of Hume’s notorious attitude toward induction is
not uncommon in contemporary formal epistemology. Is this because the field draws the formally inclined,
and the problem of constraining priors has proved formally intractable?’ Sider (2011, p. 37).
41 Compare Magnus and Callender (2004).
42 Bennett (2009), Huemer (2009), Shalkowski (2010), Kreigel (2013) and Willard (2014) all seem sym-
pathetic to this objection. See Brenner (2016) for some responses.
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objective Bayesian position that there are rational constraints on priors that (thirdly)
give precise judgments based on various types of simplicity. Fourthly, they have to
argue that these constraints apply to philosophy. Ironically, the locus classicus of
objective Bayesianism is often taken to be Carnap’s (1950b) ‘Logical Foundations of
Probability’ (see also Maher 2006).43 So the metaphysician trying to discharge the
burden of making their subject respectable can take solace from the fact that they can
draw on some parts of Carnap’s own work. The extent to which they can do so remains
an open question.
8 Conclusion
I have argued that Carnap’s rejection of metaphysics stems from his view that all
justification is based on evidence; the received wisdom that Carnap’s argument relies
on his verificationism is based on a misunderstanding. But this isn’t only a historical
point. I have argued that an updated version of the epistemological argument given
in 1928 remains a powerful challenge to metaphysics, and one that has not been
answered. The recent epistemological problems for metaphysics raised by Bennett
(2009), Kreigel (2013) and others are a return to the core of the traditional challenge.
One answer to this challenge turns on whether there are constraints on priors. And the
feeling that there are not goes someway to explaining the frustration that metaphysical
debates often induce. To allay this frustration, themetaphysician has to argue that there
are rational constraints on priors for metaphysical hypotheses. And it is not obvious
how this is to be done.
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